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Abstract 
 
Despite an abundance of policies being directed 
towards them, users often struggle to follow good 
cybersecurity practice.  Recognizing that such 
behaviors do not come naturally, a logical approach is 
to ensure that users are guided and supported in 
knowing what to do and how to do it.  Unfortunately, 
such support is often lacking.  The paper uses the 
example of password authentication as a specific 
context in which cybersecurity behavior is frequently 
criticized, but where users are often left to manage 
without sufficient support (as evidenced by examining 
the lack of related guidance and enforcement of good 
practice on leading websites). The discussion then 
proceeds to look at the effect of actively supporting the 
user, drawing upon the results from two experimental 
studies (one looking at the practical impact of 
guidance and feedback upon users’ password choices, 
and the other examining the effect of gamifying the 
password selection experience).  The results 
collectively show that such efforts can have tangible 
positive effects upon user behaviors. While the specific 
findings are focused upon passwords, similar 
principles could also be applied to other aspects of 
user-facing security. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Modern organizations are now characterized by a 
fundamental dependence upon information technology 
and knowledge management.  This in turn introduces a 
fundamental reliance upon cybersecurity in order to 
ensure that related systems and data are available when 
needed and protected from harm.   Unfortunately, 
however, those using the systems are often poor at 
cybersecurity, which tends to introduce resultant 
challenges when they are nonetheless required to use it. 
The problem spans many domains, and even those 
working directly in the field, in areas such as 
information systems and knowledge management, 
cannot be relied upon to have the necessary skills by 
default [1].  As a result, we have environments which 
are geared towards extensive knowledge sharing, but 
with inadequate posture towards knowledge protection.  
Indeed, while security and protection have long been 
identified amongst the critical success factors for 
knowledge management systems [2,3], little is often 
done to position the people involved to become 
compliant. This is not to say that technology is not 
provided with the potential to enable security; it is 
rather a case that those at the receiving end are often 
not adequately equipped to use it.  Similarly, policies 
can be set that require security to be maintained, but 
without a level of accompanying support this is less 
likely to become a feature of actual practice.  
Unfortunately, while there are some aspects of 
information technology that users often appear to take 
to without requiring much guidance, support, or 
instruction (with the use of social media and mobile 
apps being good examples), information security is 
rarely amongst them.  As a result, while users may still 
be able to get by, doing so without suitable support 
often means that they develop and adopt bad practice 
in the process, which then becomes their default 
behavior across in other contexts. 
This paper presents evidence of the problems that 
can result from a lack of security support and guidance, 
and then proceeds to examine how changes in users’ 
awareness - and more particularly their resultant 
practices - can be achieved if tangible attention is 
directed towards assisting them (e.g. by providing 
guidance and nudges towards appropriate, safer 
behaviors).  The problem of password usage is used as 
a specific focus for the discussion, with evidence 
drawn from a number of sources and experimental 
studies to demonstrate both the current challenge and 
the impact that more user-focused approaches may 
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have.  Section 2 presents some background to the 
problem, looking at the weaknesses often seen in 
password usage and examining some evidence of why 
this may occur.  Section 3 then proceeds to consider 
the impact of a more user-focused approach, 
examining the effect of supporting password use with 
baseline guidance and feedback.  Section 4 then goes 
beyond this to examine how user awareness and 
understanding can be further enhanced via 
gamification of the security tasks that they otherwise 
find challenging. The paper concludes with section 5, 
which reflects upon the overall results and discusses 
the wider implications of the findings. 
 
2. Evidencing a lack of user support 
 
If security and protection are critical success factors 
for knowledge management systems, then in turn the 
people involved are critical success factors for security.  
Unfortunately, the two are not natural bedfellows and 
users are regularly cited as a weak link in 
cybersecurity, criticized for their lack of interest and 
attention in terms of protecting systems, devices and 
data.  However, while users can certainly be held 
accountable in some contexts (most notably if they are 
actively ignoring clear advice), there are many 
scenarios in which their behavior becomes easier to 
explain if we look at the extent to which they have 
been guided or supported to do things any differently.  
To be clear on the definition here, guidance and 
support does not mean simply setting a policy and 
expecting users to follow it.  What it actually refers to 
is taking the time and effort to ensure that there is a 
means for users to be made aware of what they are 
supposed to do, ensure that they understand how to do 
it, and ideally also appreciate why it is relevant, and 
have an opportunity to be reminded of it at the relevant 
time.  Contrasting this to many so-called awareness-
raising approaches (which often do little more than 
circulate a document by email and expect it to be 
adhered to), and there is often a gap to be bridged.  
To consider a specific example as a basis for 
discussion and evidence, we can look at password-
based authentication.  This is one of the most familiar 
aspects of day-to-day cybersecurity, and it is directly 
user-facing.  Moreover, it is an aspect of security that 
has been with us for years, and while our devices 
(particularly smartphones) have now evolved to 
incorporate alternative options such as biometrics, 
passwords remain the dominant form of authentication 
across organizational systems and online services (and 
even the biometric-equipped devices still require 
passwords or PINs to be in place as underlying fallback 
methods). Thus, knowledge workers will not only be 
routinely familiar with using them on a daily basis but 
will typically have a multitude of devices and accounts 
that require them.  
In spite of all this, passwords are regularly cited as 
a prime area in which users behave poorly and fail to 
follow basic good practice, and related research can be 
found dating back over many decades [4,5].  In more 
recent years the problem has been regularly evidenced 
by the widely-cited findings from SplashData, who 
publish an annual list of the worst passwords [6].  
Table 1 lists the top-ten most frequently encountered 
passwords from the last three instances of their study, 
and clearly shows that bad choices readily persist from 
year to year with no obvious sign of improvement.  
Similarly, other findings can be easily located 
furthering highlight that – despite years of use as a 
standard security feature – passwords continue to be 
used badly [7].  As a result, they are estimated be 
implicated in more than 80% of breaches and to incur a 
significant management cost to organizations (with a 
single password reset estimated to cost over £50) [8].  
At the same time, they have proven to be form of 
authentication this is difficult to replace, as no other 
approaches offer ideal alternatives in terms of 
usability, deployability and security [9]. 
 
Table 1. SplashData top-10 worst passwords 
 
Rank 2016 2016 2017 
1 123456 123456 123456 
2 password password password 
3 12345678 12345 12345678 
4 qwerty 12345678 qwerty 
5 12345 football 12345 
6 123456789 qwerty 123456789 
7 football 1234567890 letmein 
8 1234 1234567 1234567 
9 1234567 princess football 
10 baseball 1234 iloveyou 
 
Of course, there is no shortage of guidance on how 
to choose and use passwords more effectively, with an 
example provided by [10].  A web search readily 
reveals numerous examples, and many organizations 
will themselves have taken the time to write password 
policies and may even have taken some steps to 
communicate them to staff.  However, there is often a 
mismatch between the existence of security policies 
and guidance, and the effective provision and 
promotion of it at the time that related decisions are 
actually being made – which, in this case, refers to the 
point at which users choose their passwords in practice.   
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As a specific example, we can consider the results 
of a recent assessment of the password guidance and 
enforcement practices on a series of leading websites 
[11].  This examined the extent to which the sites 
provided users with password guidance at initial sign-
up, as well as if they elected to change their password, 
or indeed were forced to change it because the original 
was forgotten.  The assessment also considered the 
extent to which any restrictions on password choices 
were provided at the initial sign-up stage (recognizing 
this as the most crucial point, given that after this the 
users would have accounts – potentially holding further 
personal details – and these passwords might be the 
only things protecting them against impostor access).   
The sites were selected from amongst the Alexa 
global list of ‘The top 500 sites on the web’ (see 
www.alexa.com/topsites), focusing upon the top ten 
sites presented in English and with distinct password 
processes (i.e. avoiding sites such as YouTube or 
Google.co.in, which used the same approach as the 
main Google site).  The resulting sites and the key 
findings are presented in Tables 2 and 3.  The former 
looks at the extent to which users were provided with 
guidance or feedback at initial sign-up, and it can 
clearly be seen that the majority of sites allowed users 
to proceed without any upfront information.  As such, 
it would not be surprising to find users attempting to 
use weak or otherwise ill-advised password choices, 
which then places more emphasis on the ability of the 
site to prevent such options from being accepted.   
 
Table 2.  Provision of password guidance and 
meter at sign-up 
 
Site Guidance Meter 
Amazon û û 
Facebook û û 
Google ü û 
Instagram û û 
Microsoft Live û û 
Netflix û û 
Reddit û ü 
Twitter û û 
Wikipedia û û 
Yahoo! û û 
 
The fact that only one out ten of the sites offered 
users interactive feedback on their choices via a 
password meter (or strength ratings) was unexpected, 
as earlier runs of the study had found this to be more 
prominent.  Indeed, the 2011 version of the assessment 
had found seven out of ten sites to be using password 
meters or ratings at the sign-up stage [12].  The 
decrease in use is somewhat surprising, given that it is 
not only serving to remove assistance, but also appears 
to overlook the positive effects that appropriately 
implemented meters have been found to deliver [13]. 
Meanwhile, Table 3 looks at the rules applied in 
order to see if the site will accept a given password 
choice. A total of six aspects were assessed: 
 
• Is a minimum password length enforced? 
• Does the site prevent the user from using their 
surname as the password (if this information is 
collected as part of registration)? 
• Does the site prevent the user ID (login name) 
from being reused as the password (or the user 
ID part of their email address, if this is used as 
the login identity)? 
• Does the site prevent the use of ‘password’? 
• Does the site require users to use more than 
one character type in the passwords (i.e. where 
types are upper and lower case letters, numeric 
characters and punctuation symbols)? 
• Does the site prevent the use of dictionary 
words (with a series of test words being used 
as candidates – including ‘diamonds’, 
‘dictionary’ and ‘football’ – the latter two of 
which were prominent in the SplashData lists, 
alongside ‘letmein’ and ‘iloveyou’ which were 
also tested as part of this criterion). 
 
As can be seen from the table, the level of 
enforcement is decidedly mixed, and various viable 
tests are excluded by some sites.  If an option is found 
to be restricted, then at this point the user will get a 
feedback message to tell them that their password 
choice is not permitted. However, they notably have to 
determine this through a process of gradual discovery 
rather than having been advised upfront.  In short, the 
sites clearly have policies, but most do not elect to tell 
the users what they are in a direct and upfront way.  
Discovering things in a piecemeal manner is likely to 
frustrate some users, especially if the feedback then 
received is still not specific enough to help them 
understand.  Indeed, we can consider the following 
examples of messages offered by the sites assessed: 
 
• Facebook – “Please choose a more secure 
password” 
• Twitter – “Please enter a stronger password” 
• Yahoo – “Please create a stronger password, 
the one that you submitted is too easy to guess” 
 
Clearly the flaw in all three cases is that while they 
are arguably attempting to nudge the user by informing 
them that their current choice is not acceptable, the 
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messages are giving no useful insight into what would 
make it better.  If users knew what ‘stronger’ and ‘more 
secure’ looked like, then they arguably might have 
avoided offering weak choices in the first place.  
As mentioned above, this assessment of websites 
was actually a repeat of a study that was first 
conducted in 2007 [14], and half of the sites that were 
included in the top-10 list then remained there in 2018.  
However, in over a decade, there have been only 
marginal improvements in the related password 
practices, and even now only a small minority of the 
leading sites (specifically Google, and arguably Yahoo 
and Microsoft Live) are taking what could be seen as 
comprehensive stance in terms of enforcing baseline 
good practice.  While Yahoo appears to accept shorter 
passwords and is indicated as not enforcing 
composition, there is actually a bit more too it in terms 
of the passwords that will be accepted. Specifically, a 
7-character password is only permitted if it includes all 
four possible character types (i.e. upper and lower-case 
letters, numeric and punctuation).  If fewer character 
types are used, then the password itself must be longer. 
The most positive finding in the 2018 assessment 
was that eight out of ten sites now offered some form 
of additional login security, via two-step verification or 
two-factor authentication options. However, while they 
were available, these features were not enabled by 
default and were not prominently promoted.  Instead, 
users typically had to go looking for them in their 
account security settings rather than having the 
opportunity highlighted to them. 
A clear message arising from this assessment is 
therefore that, although passwords are widely-
recognized as being used poorly, there is still a paucity 
of support to encourage them to be used better – even 
amongst the sites that others might regard as a 
benchmark of standard/acceptable practice (e.g. other 
providers looking to establish the authentication 
provisions on their own systems or online services 
might look at what these leading players are doing and 
consider this to be a suitable standard to follow).  Of 
course, these sites may have various reasons for not 
doing more.  For example, they may consider that users 
are not storing anything that warrants a greater level of 
protection (although users themselves may disagree 
with this, given that various personal and payment-
related details can be held in several cases), or they 
may not want to introduce anything that may act as an 
impediment to getting users to sign-up.  Indeed, 
looking at later stages, such as password change and 
(especially) reset, it is often apparent that several sites 
do then provide significantly more information.  In 
addition, one other possible reason for not providing 
guidance and feedback may be the belief that users will 
ignore it anyway.  Indeed, it may be reasoned that they 
must surely be familiar with passwords by now, and so 
telling them the rules again is hardly likely to have any 
impact.  In practice, however, this can be far from the 
case, and the next sections proceed to examine the 
differences that supporting the user can actually make.   
 
3. Examining the effect of guidance and 
feedback 
 
As the website evaluation has consistently revealed 
over the years, there is a frequent tendency to provide 
users with security mechanisms, but then leave them to 
fend for themselves rather than provide effective 
guidance to support their use.  This clearly increases 
the potential for users to make poor and ill-informed 
security decisions, which may actually increase risk. 
 
Table 3.  Password restriction applied at registration 
 
Site 
Restrictions enforced at sign-up 
 Min. length 
(+max if stated) 
Prevents 
Surname 
Prevents 
User ID 
Prevents 
‘password’ 
Enforces 
composition 
Prevents 
dictionary 
Amazon 6 û û û û û 
Facebook 6 ü - ü û ü 
Google 8 ü ü ü ü ü 
Instagram 6 û ü ü û ~ 
Microsoft Live 8 - ü ü ü ~ 
Netflix 4-60 - û û û û 
Reddit 6 - û û û û 
Twitter 6 û û ü û ~ 
Wikipedia û û ü ü û ~ 
Yahoo! 7 ü ü ü û ü 
(ü = enforced; û = not enforced; ~ = partially enforced; - = item not collected by site) 
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For example, poor decisions may result in users 
being left under-protected or even exposed as a 
consequence.  The problem goes well beyond the realm 
of authentication and passwords, but this context can 
again be used to illustrate the positive effect of doing 
things differently.  Far from being the lost cause that 
some may instinctively assume, user behavior is found 
to have significant potential to improve. 
As such, a more substantial study was conducted, 
with the aim of enabling more conclusive 
investigation, as well as exploring several parameters 
of potential influence (as opposed to simply a contrast 
between guided and unguided use). 
In order to test the effect of guidance and feedback, 
a practical experiment was conducted in which a group 
of users were asked to perform a task involving 
password selection, but with differing levels of 
guidance and feedback to support them [16].  In order 
to ensure that the experiment was realistic, the 
participants were unaware that they were participating 
in a password-related study.  From their perspective the 
primary task was to complete an online questionnaire 
about social media practices, and the creation of a 
password-based user account was an incidental activity 
required as part of the process (note that ethical 
approval was obtained in order to enable this mild 
deception).  A total of 300 users were involved in the 
study, split into five equal-sized groups that then 
received differing levels of support in selecting their 
passwords.  The characteristics in each case were as 
follows: 
 
• Scenario 1:  No guidance was provided, other 
than a request not to re-use a password already 
used on other systems. 
• Scenario 2:  Basic password guidance was 
provided alongside the password entry and 
confirmation boxes (as shown in Figure 1). 
• Scenario 3:  Basic guidance agsin, alongside 
the provision of a traditional password meter 
that rated choices as Weak, Medium or Strong. 
• Scenario 4:  Basic guidance combined with 
emoji-based feedback (a sad red-colored face 
for weak choices, a yellow neutral face for 
medium, and a smiling green face for strongly-
rated choices). 
• Scenario 5:  As for group 4, but with emojis 
being accompanied by more emotive feedback 
messages (“This is not good enough!”, “Ok, 
but you can still do better!”, or “Well done!”) 
 
In all cases, the password choices themselves 
ultimately remained unrestricted – users could elect to 
use a single character password, a dictionary word, or 
anything else and the system would permit it.  As such, 
the end results observed in terms of password choices 
were purely informed and differentiated on the basis of 
the guidance and feedback provided.  The passwords 
themselves were all rated using the same scoring 
algorithm [17] and categorized as weak, medium or 
strong depending upon the score achieved.  The 
algorithm scores passwords out of 100, awarding five 
points for each unique characters, two points for 
another instance of a character already used, and 15 
points for each new character type (e.g. uppercase, 
lowercase, numeric or punctuation) after the type 
initially used. Scoring boundaries were then defined as 
weak for 40pts or less, 41-70pts for medium, and 
above this for strong (noting that any long passwords 
scoring over 100 were capped at that level). So, a 
password such as ‘luke33’ would score 37pts and be 
rated as weak, while ‘foL34p!’ (65pts) would be 
medium, and ‘Lafe@9856!e’ (82pts) would be strong. 
The results were then stored to enable comparison of 
the performance across the different scenarios. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Baseline password selection 
guidance offered to participants 
The resultant findings are presented in Figure 2, 
and the most striking aspect is the difference in the 
proportion of weak-rated passwords between scenario 
1 and all of the others.  This clearly suggests that the 
provision of guidance at the point of relevance can 
make a tangible difference to user decisions, and (in 
the case of passwords) shows that they do not have to 
be forced into making stronger choices solely by 
means of rules and restrictions.   The more moderate 
further differences that were then made via the various 
feedback mechanisms (meter, emojis, messages) 
suggests that such nudges can also deliver further 
voluntary improvements.   
One point that should be acknowledged here is that 
the difference observed between the meter and emoji-
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based mechanisms may be as a result of the novelty 
value of the latter approach (i.e. users may have 
responded more to it because it was unusual, whereas 
many participants would have been likely to have been 
familiar with a traditional password meter approach 
from their experiences in other systems).  Nonetheless, 
the findings as a whole clearly demonstrate positive 
impact from any of the additional provisions, and so 
the key lesson is that offering something can pay off. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of the password 
strength ratings across five guidance-
feedback scenarios 
 
4. Gamification of security awareness 
 
Beyond simply ensuring that guidance is provided, 
another step is to try to make it more engaging, so that 
it increases the chance of users (a) giving their 
attention and (b) internalizing the message.  To some 
extent, this is what password meters already try to do, 
as there is a basic form of interaction going on between 
what the user chooses, what they receive as their 
rating, and what they might then do to improve it.  
However, taking this further, it is possible to explicitly 
gamify the awareness process, presenting the lessons 
and techniques in a context that engages users while 
also helping them to acquire and practice key 
knowledge and skills. The relevance and benefit of 
gamification is recognized in many situations [18], but 
its application is arguably well-suited to security given 
that this is certainly an aspect that users do not tend to 
enjoy by default and various examples of gamification 
can already be found in the security domain, 
addressing both the end-user audience and security 
professionals [19,20] 
To this end, a further experimental study examined 
the potential to engage user interest in security – and 
enhance resulting awareness and understanding – via 
the use of gamification in mobile apps.  A number of 
game concepts have been designed [21], and amongst 
those taken forward for proof-of-concept 
implementation by the authors was a game entitled 
Password Protector.  This is intended to familiarize 
users with applying good password practices, as well 
as testing and developing their ability to generate and 
remember strong password choices. 
The game was developed using C# and the 
Unity3D platform, and the basic premise is for players 
to create and remember suitably strong passwords, but 
working against the clock and with a restricted set of 
character choices to work from.  The main interface is 
shown in Figure 3, and it can be seen that the player is 
presented with a set of letters in the top right (which 
can be alternated between upper and lower case using 
the control to the left), plus a set of numeric and 
punctuation characters (again, the onscreen interface 
requires them to alternate between these in order to 
both optimize the layout of the screen and also to 
increase the challenge in completing the task within the 
time limit).  These characters are chosen at random for 
each new game/level, thereby requiring the user to 
make effective use of the characters available to them 
(and preventing them from relying upon pre-
determined choices that they might otherwise plan to 
use if they had a full character set available). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Password Protector game user 
interface 
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Table 4.  Participants’ responses to password-related statements before and after use of 
Password Protector 
 
Statement Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
I understand the concept of password 
strength 
Pre-study 18% 16% 20% 14% 32% 
Post-study 70% 26% 4% 0% 0% 
Increasing the length increases the 
strength of the password 
Pre-study 30% 18% 14% 18% 20% 
Post-study 64% 14% 14% 4% 4% 
Use of different character types in my 
password increases its strength 
Pre-study 38% 14% 20% 0% 16% 
Post-study 72% 24% 4% 0% 0% 
I can remember passwords of more than 
8 characters 
Pre-study 12% 20% 22% 24% 22% 
Post-study 56% 22% 14% 2% 6% 
I find password meters useful in checking 
if my password is strong or not 
Pre-study 16% 22% 34% 12% 16% 
Post-study 64% 22% 12% 0% 2% 
 
The player has a time limit within which to make 
their choice, and the available time decreases as the 
game proceeds to later levels (e.g. at Level 1 the limit 
is 90 seconds, then 70 at Level 2, 50 at Level 3, 40 at 
Level 4).  However, the time they take also affects the 
time limit for re-entering the password a second time.  
For example, if a user enters their initial choice within 
15 seconds, they will have 20 seconds to enter their 
verification attempt (i.e. the time they took to make the 
initial choice, plus a slight additional margin to ensure 
that they have some thinking time if required before 
having to re-enter their choice).  This again adds to the 
challenge of the game, while at the same time aiming 
to avoid the impression that the game is trying to 
encourage choices to be made at speed.   It also seeks 
to dissuade players from rushing to create a password 
without thinking about it, because they will still have 
to be able to re-enter it within a similar timeframe.   
Users’ choices are assessed in real time by a 
password meter, which rates them on a 5-point scale 
(Poor, Weak, Moderate, Good, Strong). Users must 
offer a password that is at least rated Moderate, but 
entering stronger choices increases the resulting score.  
So, while successfully completing a level basically 
requires users to choose, enter, remember and re-enter 
a qualifying password within the time limit, they can 
score differently according to the length and 
complexity of the passwords they attempt.  The 
incentive to replay is therefore to go further and/or 
better their earlier score, and in the process they will be 
honing their password selection and memory abilities. 
A practical evaluation was conducted that included 
50 participants (34 male, 16 female), and involved the 
app being made available to them to use over a two-
week period. Pre- and post-study surveys were then 
used to assess their attitudes and awareness on either 
side of the experience.    
The pre- and post-study surveys asked participants 
to respond to a number of statements regarding their 
understanding and use of passwords. The related 
results are presented in Table 4, and it is very notable 
that attitudes have become more positive as a result of 
the exposure to the game.  In most cases, the 
statements were related to areas of understanding and 
appreciation of password practice, but the 4th 
statement, around remembering passwords, relates to 
the participants’ perception of their own ability to do 
perform the task, and it seems apparent that playing the 
game has increased confidence in the ability to do 
something that only a minority of users initially 
believed they were able to do (indeed, prior to playing 
the game, only a third believed that they could do it, 
but this subsequently rose to over three quarters).  
In addition to requesting responses to the 
statements, the study also went beyond simply 
assessing what the users claimed and also evaluated 
their ability in practice.  Specifically, a further task in 
both the pre- and post-study surveys asked the 
participants to provide an example of what they 
considered to be a strong password. These attempts 
were then evaluated by the research team, by feeding 
them into the same password scoring algorithm as used 
within the game.  The notable finding here – and 
perhaps the most significant finding from this phase of 
the study – was that the average password strength 
score rose from 59% in the pre-study surveys to 80% 
in the post-study version.  This suggests a genuine and 
tangible increase in users’ understanding of what it 
takes to create a stronger password.   
It should be noted that the game is not attempting to 
provide any evidence of the players’ ability to 
remember and recall strong passwords in the longer-
term.  What it hopes to demonstrate to users is that 
they are able to create and re-enter better passwords 
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without requiring much additional time or effort.  As 
such, the intent (and apparent effect based on the 
accompanying survey results) is to increase the user’s 
confidence in their own ability to do this aspect of the 
wider security task. 
As an aside, it should be noted that users were also 
asked to rate the game itself in terms of aspects such as 
design, ease use, interest, and fun (all of which are 
relevant if it is something the user is expected to enjoy 
playing and to come back to, rather than be asked to 
use but still regard as a chore).  In these respects, the 
results were significantly positive, with all users 
indicating that the game was fun and provided an 
interesting means to learn about this aspect of 
cybersecurity. 
The findings again contribute towards a wider view 
that the users can - and will - do better with password 
security if they are given a means of support to do so. 
As mentioned above, Password Protector was just one 
of several game concepts that were devised as part of 
this particular project, and others targeted different 
aspects of cybersecurity that have the potential to 
affect the general user community.  Indeed, another 
game concept that was also implemented and evaluated 
in the same manner was titled Malware Guardian, 
which sought to increase players’ awareness of 
malware threats by requiring them to act as the 
defender of a target system (while also emphasizing 
the importance of supporting actions such as system 
updates and backup in ensuring their overall 
protection).  While a full examination of the related 
results is outside the scope of the current paper, it can 
be noted that this game was also met with a positive 
evaluation.  This again helps to support the case that 
while passwords have been used as the specific focus 
in the current discussion, the underlying points around 
user awareness and support can be readily applied to 
other aspects of cybersecurity as well.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
User behavior is often the downfall of what might 
otherwise be effective security mechanisms. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that the users 
themselves are at fault, as we cannot reasonably expect 
them to manage knowledge systems securely if they 
lack the knowledge of how to do so. It is not just a 
question of instructing them or enforcing restrictions 
upon them – the point is helping them to recognize and 
understand the security issues form themselves. 
Although setting and enforcing policy can have an 
effect, and may even succeed in getting users to do 
what is needed in a particular context, getting them to 
understand things stands a better chance of achieving 
acceptance and affecting their default behaviors (which 
in turn has clear links back to established theories, such 
as those relating to Reasoned Action [22] and Planned 
Behaviour [23]).  Of course, a lack of awareness or 
understanding is not the barrier for all users; some 
simply do not care enough and lack the incentive or 
motivation to comply.  However, while such users 
clearly exist, it is reasonable to believe that they are in 
the minority, and so the provision of appropriate 
support is still a fair expectation for the remainder that 
we have a chance of appealing to. 
The password-related findings help to support these 
beliefs.  By default, systems and services often do very 
little to present upfront guidance and support (even 
though users may ultimately be prevented from doing 
some of the wrong things via underlying restrictions).  
As a result, we continue to see users gravitating 
towards bad practice when the opportunity arises (as 
illustrated by the SplashData findings).  However, it 
clearly does not have to be this way.  The use of 
password guidance and feedback had clear effects upon 
the users within the experimental study, and a 
significant proportion moved away from weak 
passwords simply as a result of information being 
provided to them.  They still had the option to make 
weak choices, but the provision of guidance and 
nudges at the appropriate point (i.e. while they were 
making the security decision concerned) had a positive 
effect without resorting to any enforcement of rules 
and restrictions. Similarly, the findings from the 
Password Protector game suggested that if users are 
shown the effects of different behaviors, they may be 
inclined to choose the better ones.  Moreover, the 
experience of playing the game appeared to changed 
users’ perceptions of what they could do (e.g. some 
may previously have avoided choosing longer 
passwords on the mistaken belief that they would not 
remember them), and post-testing suggested that this 
had actually changed behaviors.  Given that the study 
was not longitudinal, it could clearly be questioned 
whether such changes might be transient, but the 
collective findings suggest that, with appropriate 
reminders and reinforcement, the effect could become 
longer term. 
For the avoidance of doubt, these findings should 
not be mistaken for an argument towards maintaining 
passwords over other forms of authentication.  
Passwords themselves are still an inadequate and 
unfriendly approach, and simply do not scale to the 
number of systems that now expect us to use them.  No 
matter what guidance and nudges are given, most users 
will find it impossible to choose strong passwords for 
all the devices, sites and services that they use without 
resorting to duplication and/or the use of some form of 
password management solution.  Moreover, there are 
still going to be categories of attack against passwords 
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(e.g. keylogging and backend breaches) in which the 
strength will have no impact anyway, plus it has also 
been argued that (past a certain point) pushing for 
better password composition is not worth the additional 
user effort required to achieve it [24].  However, 
passwords continue to be used, and thus the point 
remains that we could support people better in using 
them.    
In terms of how to take the lessons into practice, 
the findings should not be regarded as a script that is 
expected to be followed exactly.  For example, it is not 
proposed that all users should be required to play the 
Password Protector before choosing passwords on 
other systems – the point is rather that doing so has 
been shown to have a positive impact, and so has likely 
value within a wider arsenal of approaches to password 
education (which would also include providing 
guidance and feedback during actual password 
selection).  Indeed, no single technique is being 
advocated as the answer in its own right, and over-
emphasis of any particular approach would in any case 
be likely to lead to diminishing returns over time and 
lead to the risk of user fatigue.  The hope is to promote 
understanding that judicious availability and usage of a 
range of interventions has the likelihood of improving 
matters over the typical level of success that has 
traditionally been seen with passwords.  Moreover, 
even passwords are just being used as an example 
context here; the wider point is that better 
understanding, use and acceptance of security more 
generally could be achieved by promoting it to users in 
more effective ways. 
The fact that users struggle with passwords and 
would benefit from support in using them is not a new 
finding.  Indeed, [25] had flagged the need for 
instruction, training and constructive online feedback 
back in 1999.  The disappointing fact is that we not 
only seem no closer to addressing the situation with 
passwords, but we now also suffer the same problems 
with other forms of user-facing security as well. 
Illustrative examples of further security tasks and 
responsibilities that users might be encouraged to enact 
better would include: 
 
• Anti-malware scanning and updating 
• Backup  
• Data leakage/loss prevention (including 
avoidance of phishing and other forms of 
social engineering) 
• Privacy management (relating to their own 
data and that of the organization) 
• Vulnerability management (i.e. patching) 
 
All of these represent contexts in which users are 
again prone to making choices borne out of ignorance 
or geared towards serving their own convenience, but 
where their decisions might arguably change if they 
were better informed.  Added to this, there are many 
cases in which knowledge workers are basically at the 
mercy of technology provided, and so even if they 
want to be security-conscious their efforts may be 
frustrated by tools that are not sufficiently intuitive or 
usable [26].  With all of these factors in play, it is 
certainly not appropriate or fair to simply shrug and 
blame the users for the situation.  Only if reasonable 
attempts have been made to guide and support them 
can they be viewed as being at fault for the 
cybersecurity issues that they may introduce.  This in 
turn links back into the overall provision of an 
effective knowledge management structure [27], with 
governance mechanisms being used to ensure that 
policies and guidance are promoted to staff in an 
appropriate manner. 
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